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Abstract
This paper explores the consequences of pension reforms in Western Europe in a
world economy setting. Whereas various economic and social consequences of
ageing have been investigated in OECD countries, very few analyses have explic-
itly taken the worldwide aspect of the problem into account. In order to do so,
we rely on the new version of the INGENUE model. This applied, international,
overlapping-generations, general-equilibrium model of the world economy has
been built noticeably to analyze the international capital flows and growth dy-
namics induced by differential ageing of the various regions of the world. After
a description of the major features of the baseline scenario of the model for the
world economy over the next 50 years, we explore the domestic and international
macroeconomic consequences of two scenarios of pension reforms in Western
Europe as well as their intergenerational distributional effects. We compare these
scenarios with a specific migration scenario, which is allowed by the new features
of the INGENUE 2 model.
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1 Introduction : Ageing and Capital Flows
Demographic transition and the consequent population aging are putting the pay-
as-you-go (PAYG) pension systems of OECD countries under stress and fostering
various reforms. The latter will have economic consequences that are likely to
be important and far-reaching, both in the domestic economies of the countries
implementing them, and in the world economy, given the current and foreseeable
degree of international economic and financial integration. Current population
structures and demographic projections for the various regions of the world show
that the aging process is not synchronous: over the next decades, while OECD
countries – and most notably Europe and Japan – will experience large increases
in their old-age dependency ratios, other regions of the world will be facing rela-
tively low ratios and still rising working-age populations. This difference in time
profiles of demographic changes suggests that inter-temporal trade, in the form of
international capital flows, would be mutually advantageous compared to a situa-
tion of economic and financial autarky.
While populations in OECD countries have been aging for a long time now, rais-
ing living standards in other parts of the world are also bringing longer life ex-
pectancy and falling fertility rates in developing countries: the so-called demo-
graphic transition pattern is progressively spreading over the entire world; thus,
the world population is aging, but at a different pace and with different calendars
in the various regions of the world. Whereas various economic and social con-
sequences of aging have been investigated in OECD countries, very few analyses
have explicitly taken the worldwide aspect of the problem into account. Indeed,
this generalized but differentiated aging process is occurring in a world of increas-
ing capital mobility and financial globalization, which suggests that it may give
rise to new opportunities for profitable exchanges amongst regions, a situation of
mutually beneficial gains from inter-temporal trade through international finan-
cial transactions. The purpose of this analysis is therefore to evaluate the potential
magnitude of such capital flows: if they are found very large compared to what
has been observed in the past (end of the XIX◦ century up to World-War-I) or in
more recent years, such a prospect raises the issue of international financial insta-
bility and of the institutions and regulations that would have to be set up to make
such large capital flows between developed and ageing countries on the one hand,
and developing countries with younger populations in the other hand, sustainable.
This paper presents, and makes use of, an applied, international, overlapping-
generations, general-equilibrium (OGGE) model of the world economy built upon
the 2000 United Nations (UN) demographic projections to study the prospects
of asset accumulation and investment in the various regions of the world and of
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international capital flows over the next few decades.
We rely on the second version od tne INGENUE model. The first version of the
model has already been used to investigate the impact of differenciated ageing
on worldwide capital flows. Here we use the second version of the model which
brings a number of improvements. This new version allows to investigate mi-
gration scenarios which are another key issue when discussing the adjustment to
differenciated ageing throughout the world.
The first section of the paper presents the model, and discusses a number of as-
pects of the calibration process. The transition path of the baseline scenario is
described and briefly commented in section 2. Section 3 explores the aggregate
consequences, on the world economy and on regions, of two contrasted pension
reform scenarios in Western Europe, and of a specific migratory scenario : a con-
stant contribution rule; a postponement of retirement ; we compare the latter with
a migratory scenario calibrated in order to limit the rise of the dependency ratio
between 2000 and 2050 in Western Europe, as in the postponement of retirement
age case. The comparison with pension reforms scenarios seems accurate as in-
creasing labour mobility is a potentially important mechanism through which the
global economy could respond to demographic change and is therefore an alterna-
tive to the flow of capital. We also investigate the intergenerational consequences
of these reforms.
2 An international, inter-temporal model of the world
economy with realistic demographic forecasts
The INGENUE model is a multi-region, world model. The world is divided into
ten regions, each of which is made of four categories of economic agents : the
households, the firms, a fictive world producer of a world intermediate good, and
a Pay As You Go (PAYG) retirement pension system.
2.1 A brief overview on the Ingenue project
The first version of the INGENUE model describes a multi-region, world model,
in the spirit of those developed by Obstfeld & Rogoff (1996, chap. 3), in which
the structure of each regional economy is similar to that of other applied, OGGE
models, such as Auerbach & Kotlikoff (1987), except that labour supply is exoge-
nous.
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In the first version of the model, the world was divided into six regions, each of
which made of three categories of economic agents: the households, the firms,
and a PAYG retirement pension system. There was only one good, and only one
financial asset, which was an ownership stake in the firms’ productive capital ;
both of them were freely traded on perfectly competitive world markets. There
was no money and hence only two relative prices in each region: the (real) wage
rate accruing to local, internationally immobile, workers; and the single (real)
price of financial assets, both expressed in terms of goods, which may be chosen
as numéraire. Hence, the various regions of the world were economically and
financially perfectly integrated and there was only one world market for goods
and one for financial assets.
Several studies were carried out with this first model (among which Ingenue
(2002a), Ingenue (2002b), IMF (2004)), noticeably to assess the effects of pen-
sion reforms in Europe, but the model soon appeared to be unrealistic in some
of its outcomes because of some irrelevant elements in its theoretical structure.
So it was decided to built a new version of this model and also to improve the
calibration data and procedure. The main improvements are the following :
1. Demographics : the World is now divided in 10 regions. In order to make
autonomous own demographic projections the model includes a population
projection model based upon UN coefficient methods.
2. We now assume uncertainty in lifetime expectancy at individual level. At
the macroeconomic level there is still no uncertainty about it.
3. International trade of commodities : In order to deal with relative price
movements of foreign and domestic goods we assume that the different
countries produce different, imperfectly substitutable intermediate goods as
in Backus, Kehoe & Kydland (1995). This will imply the existence of real
exchange rates between the different regions. Here the main determinants
of exchange rates are the relative productivity in the two productive sectors
as in the standard view developed since Obstfeld and Rogoff works (i.e. the
famous Balassa-Samuelson effect that is prominent in long run explanations
of difference in real exchange rates).
4. We model region-specific interest rates to debtor that differ from the unique
world interest rate to creditor by imposing an ad hoc convex function of the
region ownership ratio.
5. Calibration improvements : introduction of inheritances based upon a be-
quest motive (in order to get a more realistic modelling of saving rates), age-
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specific labour participation rates (exogenous), age-specific human capital
(exogenous), labour income of children in some parts of the world . . .
In the following, we present in more detail the demographic model (2.2) before
describing the macroeconomic framework (2.3) and the world general equilibrium
(2.4).
2.2 Demographics
2.2.1 Regions
The World is divided in 10 regions according mainly to geographical and demo-
graphic criteria. The content of each region is detailed in Appendix A. These
regions are labelled : Western Europe, Eastern Europe, North America, Latin
America, Japan, Mediterranean World, Chinese World, Africa, Russian World
and Indian World.
2.2.2 Population structure and Projection Method
In the first version of the model, the demographic data selected were the 2050
projections of the United Nations (extrapolated numerically until 2100). The new
version includes a specific model for demographic projections. Indeed, the de-
mographic shifts being in the core of the model, it is crucial to be able to study
the impact of various demographic assumptions on pension systems and on the
flows of capital. We thus elaborate a simple methodology of construction of the
demographic data. To guarantee the consistency of this method, a central scenario
is calibrated to reproduce UN data.
The period of the model is set to five years. In each region z, the economy is
populated by 21 overlapping generations of one-gender agents who may not live
longer than 105 years. For notation purpose,age is denoted by a ∈ [0, . . . , 20].
For instance, a=2 corresponds to the 10-14 years-old individuals. The number of
people of age a at time t is denoted by Lza(t)1. At date t the number of "births" (in-
dividuals between 0 and 4 years old) is then denoted by Lz0(t) and total population
alive at time t in the region z is Lz(t) =
∑20
a=0 L
z
a(t).
Population evolution is calculated according to a standard population projection
method on the basis of historical and prospective UN data. We aggregate the
population structure accross the countries of each regions , with the UN data from
1950 to 1995. Then we project fertility and mortality trends (for both sexes) at the
1More generally, for any household variable, a subscript a denotes age and an argument t in
parentheses denotes calendar time.
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region-aggregate level. This, together with initial population structures in 1995, 
allows us to obtain the evolution of the population at a world level from 2000 until 
the ending date of the model. In the baseline scenario, we implicitly assume that 
there is no migration flow in the future. With some usual population projection 
methods, the evolutions of mortality and fertility tables are constructed on the only 
basis of life expectancy and global fertility rates evolutions in the future2. 
Mortality People die before 105 years old; If sa denotes the conditional probabil-
ity of surviving between age a and age a+1, the number of age a−1 individuals 
then follows: 
Lza(t) = sza−1(t − 1) Lz a−1(t − 1) for all a > 0   (1) 
 
Πa−1 si(t+i) is then the unconditional probability of being alive at age "a" when 
born at date t. For population projections, we then need some process to describe 
the evolution of {sza−1(t − 1)a>0 for t = 2000, …,  T (for both sexes). For this, we 
first have to set starting and ending mortality tables. The starting tables are taken 
from UN data between years 1995 and 2000. The ending table are chosen among 
UN "typical" long run mortality tables (from Coale & Demeny (1966)). We then 
have to choose a date when the convergence to the long run table will be achieved 
and a process for convergence between the initial date and this specific date. Ac-
cording to UN methods, we extrapolate future mortality tables on the basis of an 
expected trend for life expectancy. We adopt a linear process of convergence. 
Fertility Process At each time, the number of births is equal to  
Lz0(t) = Σ9a=3 fza (t)Lfaz(t) (where Lfaz(t) is the female population of age a at 
time t), and fza is the average age-specific fertility rate. Following UN projections, 
we implicitly assume that women fertility occurs only between 15 and 50 years old. 
2.2.3 Main demographic features 
We now comment the demographic projections from 2000 to 2050. According to 
this baseline scenario, Japan is the first country to undergo the most severe demo-
graphic shock. The lengthening of the life expectancy is accompanied by a collapse 
of the birthrate, which reaches 1.43 child by woman in 1995, against 1.99 in the 
North America region and 1.7 in Western Europe. At the same time, one must 
notice that the baby-boom in Japan begun earlier and was proportionally more 
pronounced than in Europe. The persistence of a very weak birthrate 
 
 
2 More details is available in a technical notice upon request at the authors at the following 
e-mail address: ingenue@cepremap.cnrs.fr. 
i=0 
after 1995 until 2050 accentuates this phenomenon. This evolution for birthrate
after 1995 explains the decline of labour force in developed countries in the next
decades (see Figure 1). Japan is the first country to experiment a negative growth
rate of the working-age population, in 2005.
Figure 1: Working-age population annual growth rate (percentage) : 1960 - 2050
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By contrast, in the North America zone, the rate of reproduction of generations,
near of 1 in 1995 (0.96), drops only slightly until 2050 to stabilize at 0.93 and the
birth rate remains above 1.9 child by woman. Hence, the working-age population
begins to decline only in 2020.
Western Europe is in an intermediate situation, partly because extreme situa-
tions (Scandinavian countries, Germany, Ireland...) are mutually neutralized. The
grouping in the same geographical area is then justified on the basis of strong
interdependence between these economies (long-lived single market, Euro zone).
One must note that because the institutional rules about legal age of retirement dif-
fer between Western Europe and Japan (Europeans quit earlier) the dependency
ratio is greater in the former than in the latter despite the working-age population
growing faster in Western Europe (see figure 2).
Concerning the emerging or in transition countries advanced in their demographic
transition process (i.e. Chinese World, Eastern Europe and Russian world) they
are characterized by a rapidly ageing population which is projected to be even
more pronounced than in Western Countries around the middle of the century for
Eastern Europe and especially for the Russian world (see Figure 3).
The others regions are more heterogeneous. They comprise countries in progress
in their demographic revolution or for which the latter should only intervene be-
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Figure 2: Dependency ratio (retirees in percentage of total working age popula-
tion) : 2000 - 2050
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tween 2000 and 2050 (South America, Indian World) and some countries where
the demographic transition process is still at its beginning (Mediterranean World
and Africa). As a consequence, they are characterized by a sustained growth of
their population and then of their working-age population (figure 1). The profile
is different with respect to the previous groups : demographic growth rates are
higher; the population comprises a higher proportion of young people but life ex-
pectancy is, on average, appreciably shorter ; hence the old age dependency ratio
is low but it doubles throughout the period 1995-2050. As a consequence of the
dynamism of their working-age population, these regions will need a lot of capital
to equip their numerous potential workers.
We now look at the share of the 45-69 years old population in total population
of each region, because high savers are concentrated on this age group. One can
see on Figure 3 that the proportion of high savers in total population follows a
wave pattern that propagates from one region of the world to the next through
the decades. The ratio culminates first in Japan as soon as 1995 and remains at a
high level until 2030. Then North America experiences its maximum in 2025 and
Western Europe in 2030, Eastern Europe, Russia and China after this date. All are
regions with declining labour force and thus hamper growth in the future. On the
contrary, the regions found on Figure 1 as the potentially fast-growing regions see
a progressive ageing leading to an increase of the high savers ratio which does not
culminate before 2050. It follows that saving will flow from early high savers to
late high savers in the coming decades. This demographic feature will influence a
lot the saving rates in the next decades in our model because life cycle hypothesis
7
is in the heart of the saving behaviour of households in the INGENUE model.
Figure 3: High savers ratio (age group 45-69 years in percentage of total popula-
tion) : 1960 - 2050
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2.3 Macroeconomic framework
2.3.1 Households
Individuals are assumed to become adults when they turn 20 (a0 = 4 in the follow-
ing formulas). At each date, the household sector is then made of 17 overlapping
cohorts of "adults", aged between 20 and 105, and of 4 cohorts of "young" peo-
ple. Adults can (partially) retire from age rz and they may not stay in the labour
force after a legal maximal mandatory retirement age r¯z. Economic choices of
households concern consumption/saving. They are made with perfect foresight
at the beginning of their adult life. Between 15 and 50 yrs. adults are supposed
to give birth to children, according to the fertility calendar. Children are depen-
dent until they turn 20, they consume with a cost per child that is supposed to be
proportional to the parents consumption.
Labour supply is assumed to be exogenously given by the age-specific rate of
participation to the labour market, noted : eza. We take International Labour Orga-
nization (ILO) data and projections to characterize activity from 1950 until 2015
and we assume that after this date participation rates remain fixed at their 2015
level. According to this database people may work since the age of 10 so we will
take children labour income into account in the budget constraint of their parents.
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The intertemporal preferences of a new entrant in working life are given by the
following life-time utility function over uncertain streams of consumption cza and
leaving a voluntary bequest Hz to their children when they reach the age of T (if
they survive until this age)3 :
U za0(t) =
20∑
a=a0
ρa−a0
[
a−1∏
i=a0
szi (t+ i)
]
η
η − 1c
z
a(t+ a− a0)
η−1
η
+ ρT−a0
T∏
i=a0
szT (t+ T − a0)V (Hz(t+ T − a0)) (2)
where ρ is the psychological discount factor4, Ca is consumption at age a ; η is
the intertemporal substitution rate and V (·) is the instantaneous utility of bequest
: each agent has some felicity from leaving a bequest but it is independent of the
future stream of the consumption that his children draw from this bequest (warm
glow altruism). This bequest behaviour is mainly adopted to deal with calibration
issues (empirically savings for life-cycle can only explain part of saving motiva-
tions).
At any given period, the budget constraint is :
τ za (t)p
z
f (t)C
z
a(t) + p
z
f (t)S
z
a(t) = Y
z
a (t) + p
z
f (t)S
z
a−1(t− 1)
Rz(t)
sa−1(t− 1)
+ pzf (t)h
z
a(t)− pzf (t)Hz(t)ΥT (t) (3)
Y za (t) =

ζza(t) + (1− θz(t))wz(t)ea(t)ϑa for a < ra
(1− θz(t))wz(t)ea(t)ϑa + (1− ea(t))P za (t) for ra ≤ a < r¯a
P za (t) for a ≥ r¯a
where Sza denotes the stock of assets held by the individual at the end of age a and
time t, Rz(t) · Sa(−1) is financial income (domestic real returns on assets hold-
ings times wealth). We assume Sa0−1 = 0 and S20 ≥ 0 for all a ∈ [a0, . . . , 20].
τa is the age-specific equivalence scale that takes into account costs of child-
rearing (see details hereafter), and Ya is the non assets-based net disposal income.
3Usually in these kind of model the age T is the biological limit to life (here 105 years.) but
in order to imply a realistic pattern of inheritance among the children of deceased households, we
assume that T is equal to 80 years old.
4 Notice that the effective discount rate is equal to
∏a−1
i=a0
szi (t + i)
η
η−1ρ
a−a0
, meaning that
agents only care of their future as long as they stay alive. In other words the expectation takes into
account that the agent can die before 105 years old.
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τ za (t)p
z
f (t)C
z
a(t) denotes the total consumption (that is the consumption of the par-
ents and the one of their children). pzf (t)Sza(t) represents the wealth at the end of
date t. pzf (t) denotes the price of the domestic final good (in terms of one foreign
goods, see below) so Rz(t) is one plus the return to capital income expressed in
units of this final good. Due to life uncertainty at the individual level one may
think that there exists unintended bequests. Instead of this, we assume following
Yaari (1965) that there exists perfect annuities markets that pool death risk within
the same generation so that the return to capital is "corrected" by the instanta-
neous survival probability of the generation. Besides children receive inherited
assets hza(t − 1) from the voluntary bequests of their parents. People will leave
bequest Hz(t) to their heirs only at the age of T, so in Equation (3) ΥT (t) is a
dummy that will be equal to 1 if a = T and zero in any other case.
For full-time active years (a ∈ [a0, ra[), Ya is simply equal to the net labor income
after social security taxes (at rate θ), where w is the real wage rate per efficient
unit of labour at time t. When the agent is partly retired (a ∈ [ra, r¯a[), she also
receives a pension benefit P za for the unworked hours. And when she is full-
time retired (a ∈ [r¯a, 20]) she only receives the pension benefit. Unless special
mention, pension benefits are assumed to be age independent.
The τ za term is the age-specific equivalence scale. It takes into account the direct
and indirect private costs of child-rearing. In order to calculate this relative cost of
child-rearing for each cohort we need first to know the age distribution of children
for each parent (from their past fertility behaviour) and second we need the age
“c" (for child) equivalence scale of children βc, which will be assumed here to be
constant :
τ za (t) = 1 +
min(3,a−3)∑
c=max(0,a−12)
βc · Lc,za (t) a = 4, . . . , 12 (4)
where the average number Lca of children of age c raised by cohort of age a can be
recovered from fertility evolution (given the fertility calendar and the early death
of both children and parents). For simplicity, the children depending of parents
younger that 20 years old are assumed to be “allocated" between the adults that
have children of the same age (allocation with age-specific weights)5. ζza(t) is the
labour income that children bring to their parents resources during their childhood
(calculated in the same spirit as costs of children-rearing).
5Trying to get a more detailed structure would entail keeping the distribution of children with
respects to their grand-parents and would complicate in an useless way the number of state vari-
ables in the system.
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An agent’s earning ability is assumed to be an exogenous function of his age.
These skill differences by age are captured by the efficiency parameter ϑa which
changes with age in a hump-shape way to reflect the evolution of human capital.
For simplicity, we assume that this age-efficiency profile is time-invariant and
is the same in all regions. In the baseline case we adopt Miles (1999) human
capital profile’s estimation (for the United Kingdom) and ϑa is normalized so that
ϑa0 = 1.
New cohorts choose their plans for current and future consumption as well as
bequest in order to maximize their lifetime utility (2) under their intertemporal
budget constraint taking prices, social contributions and benefits as given. At the
equilibrium, the first order conditions for this program will yield (together with
(3) and the transversality condition S20 = 0 assumed to be satisfied), ∀z :
Cza+1(t+ 1) = C
z
a(t) ·
[
ρRz(t+ 1)
τ za (t)
τ za+1(t+ 1)
]η
a ∈ [a0, 20[ (5)
CzT (t)
− 1
η = V ′ (Hz(t)) (6)
Voluntary bequests are distributed to children according to the fertility calendar
of their deceased parents. Taking Blinder (1975) functional form for V, we obtain
a simple linear relation for (6) : CzT = ΨzHz, where Ψ indicates the degree of
altruism. At the equilibrium the sum of voluntary bequest will be equal to the
inheritance received by children :
LzT (t)H
z(t) =
T−9∑
a=T−3
La(t)ha(t) (7)
Notice that people of age T have only children between age T −9 and T −3 so we
have ha(t) = 0 for all a /∈ [T−9, . . . , T−3]. For a ∈ [T−9, . . . , T−3], we assume
that bequests are distributed equally to all children. Hence ha is proportional to
the proportion of the children born from cohort of age T (according to her past
fertility calendar).
In our international context, households can choose the region they want to invest
their wealth. So we need another equilibrium equation characterizing the tradeoff
between domestic and foreign assets :
Rz(t) = R?(t)
pzf (t− 1)
pzf (t)
for all t > 0 (8)
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where R?(t) is the unique world interest factor (in terms of the world numéraire),
the condition (8) means that if a region z’household saves one unit in his domestic
asset (capital) it will yield Rz(t) in real terms the next period, if he chooses to
invest in foreign assets he will receive in real terms R?(t)p
z
f (t−1)
pzf (t)
. The arbitrage
condition then leads to return equalization.
2.3.2 The public sector
The public sector is reduced to a social security department ; it is a Pay-As-You-
Go (PAYG) public pension scheme, that is supposed to exist in all regions of the
world. It is financed by a payroll tax on all labor incomes and pays pensions to
retired households. The regional PAYG systems operate according to a defined-
benefit rule : the pension P za (t) paid is a fraction - or replacement rate (κ(t)) – of
the current average (net of tax) wage [1− θz(t)]wz(t). We assume a time-to-time
balanced-budget rule :
θz(t)
1− θz(t) = κ(t) ·
∑
a≥ra(1− ea(t))La(t)∑
a≤r¯a ea(t)La(t)
(9)
In the baseline case, the regional age ra of minimum legal retirement age as well
as the maximum age r¯a and the ratio κ(t) are fixed (at least after year 2000).
Payroll tax rates θ(t) are thus endogenously determined by (9).
2.3.3 Production side
(i.) Intermediate good sector
Each zone z specializes in the production Y Iz of a single intermediate good,
where subscript z indicates that the specific nature of this good lies in its region
of origin. Production in period t takes place with a constant return to scale Cobb-
Douglas production function using capital stock Kz(t− 1) installed at the begin-
ning of the period t in the country z and the full domestic labor force N z(t), ∀z
:
Y Iz(t) = AIz(t) (Kz(t− 1))α (N z(t))1−α 0 < α < 1 (10)
The current cash-flow of the representative domestic firm of the intermediate sec-
tor (in terms of the world numéraire) is given by :
CF z(t) = pzI(t)Y I
z(t)− wz(t)N z(t)− pzfIz(t) for t > 0
CF z(t) = pzI(t)Y I
z(t)− wz(t)N z(t)− pzf (1− δz(t))Kz(t− 1) for t = 0
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where pzI is the price of the domestic intermediate good ; Iz(t) = Kz − Kz(t −
1)(1−δz(t)) are the gross investment expenses in domestic final good and δz(t) is
the rate of economic depreciation. In time 0 the present value of the firm is equal
to :
Πz(0) = CF z(0) +
∞∑
t=1
CF z(t)∏t
s=0R
?(t)
(11)
where R?(t) is the factor of interest on the world financial market. Let us denote
kz(t − 1) = Kz(t − 1)/N z(t) the capital-labour ratio, the maximization of the
firm value will imply that at the equilibrium (∀t) :
R?(t+ 1)
pzf (t)
pzf (t+ 1)
+ δz(t+ 1)− 1 = p
z
I(t+ 1)
pzf (t+ 1)
αAIz(t+ 1) (kz(t))α−1(12)
wz(t) = pzI(t)(1− α)AIz(t) (kz(t− 1))α(13)
(ii.) A “trick" to model real imperfections on world financial market
For a world macroeconomic model to be realistic, the world asset capital market
has to be imperfect. Because sources of imperfection and asymmetries in financial
markets are various and uneasy to model with rigourous micro-foundations in such
a large scale model as Ingenue, we adopt the following ad hoc formulation for δz
the region-specific rate of economic depreciation, with ε > 0 :
δz(t) = δ¯z + (1− δ¯z)∆z · Max
(
1− S
z(t− 1)
Kz(t− 1); 0
)ε
for all z (14)
where Sz(t) =
∑19
a=a0
La(t)Sa(t) is the aggregate wealth across all cohorts in
region z. Aggregate financial wealth is equal to the sum of the region capital
stock and the net assets on the rest of the world. This equation then indicates that
capital invested in a region z depreciates more rapidly than the average when the
region is a net debtor to the rest of the world.
The depreciation ratio is asymmetrically6 dependent on the ownership ratio (total
wealth of households/ capital stock). An ownership ratio less than one indicates
that the region is a net debtor. In those regions the imperfections of international
financial markets raise the cost of capital the more the larger foreign debt. It shows
up in a higher rate of economic depreciation of the capital stock. In creditor
6With this formulation the domestic cost of capital for the intermediate good sector may be
greater than the world cost but never be lower.
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regions (ownership ratio above one) the rate of depreciation is a constant, thus
independent on financial condition.
This differenciated depreciation rate corrects for the fact that the world interest
rate is used for calculating the value of the firm (equation (11). In a net debtor
region, δz will be higher, hence CF z lower an Πz also lower. This will reduce the
incentive to produce the intermediate good.
(iii.) Final good production sector
In the spirit of (Backus et al. 1995), we assume that the domestic, composite final
good of region z (consumption and investment), Y F z, is produced according to
a combination of two intermediate goods : a "domestic" intermediate good in
proportion Bz and a "World" intermediate good in proportion M z, according to
the following CES technology, where σ ≥ 0 denotes the elasticity of substitution,
∀z :
Y F z(t) = AF z(t)
[
(ωz)
1
σz (Bz(t))
σz−1
σz + (1− ωz) 1σz (M z(t))σ
z−1
σz
] σz
σz−1 (15)
with ωz ∈ [0, 1]. This CES combination of external and internal good to produce
domestic final good is a reminiscence of Armington (1969) aggregator, AF z(t)
being total factor productivity. Taking prices as given, the competitive behaviour
the producer determines Bz and M z that minimizes current profit: pzf (t)Y F z(t)−
pzI(t)B
z(t) − p?(t) · M z(t) subject to (15), where pzI is the price of the home-
specific intermediate good and p? is the price of the world intermediate good,
both expressed in terms of a specific intermediate good used as the numéraire
(see below). The static maximization problem of a representative competitive
firm gives at the equilibrium the following first order conditions :
Bz(t) = ωz
(
pzI(t)
pzf (t)
)−σz
Y F z(t)
(AF z(t))1−σ
z , (16)
M z(t) = (1− ωz)
(
p?(t)
pzf (t)
)−σ
Y F z(t)
(AF z(t))1−σ
z (17)
where pzf can be shown to be equal to the following aggregate price index :
pzf (t) =
[
ωzzp
z
I(t)
1−σz + (1− ωz) p?(t)1−σz] 11−σz
AF z(t)
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2.3.4 The world producer of an homogenous world intermediate good
In order to simplify the exchanges of intermediate goods between regions of the
world, we assume that there exists a fictive world producer that uses all region-
specific intermediate goods in quantities X?,z in order to produce a specific world
intermediate good Y ? according to the following CES function :
Y ?(t) = A?(t)
[∑
z
γz(t)
1
µXz(t)
µ−1
µ
] µ
µ−1
(18)
This fictive producer is assumed to act competitively, taking prices as given.
Hence, he chooses {Xz(t)}z, at each period, to maximize its static profit : p?(t)Y ?(t)−∑
z p
z
I(t) ·Xz(t), subject to (18). This yields at the equilibrium the following fac-
tor demand function :
Xz(t) = γz(t) (Ez(t))−µ Y ?(t)A?(t)µ−1 for all z (19)
where for convenience Ez(t) = p
z
I (t)
p?(t)
is defined as the terms of trade. It can be
shown that at the equilibrium p? equals to :
p? =
[
∑
z γzp
z
I(t)
1−µ]
1
1−µ
A?(t)
2.4 The world general equilibrium
2.4.1 Definition : the competitive world-equilibrium with social security
schemes
Given the initial stock of capital installed in each zone {Kz(0)}z=1,..,10 ; initial
distributions {Sza(0)}z=1,..,10;a=a0,..,19 of savings across age groups a in each zone
z ; initial prices for domestic commodities {pzf (0)}z=1,..,10 and exogenous popu-
lation prospects {Lza(t)}t≥1;z=1,..,10;a=0,..,20 with {Lc,za (t)}t≥1;z=1,..,10;a=0,..,20;c=0,..,9
the children distributions ; the technical progress process {AIz(t), AF z(t)}t≥1;z=1,..,10
and social security policies {r¯a, ra, κz(t), θz(t)}t≥1;z=1,..,10 that satisfy (9), a com-
petitive world-equilibrium with social security is a set of sequences for regional
prices and social security transfers {wz(t), R(t)z, pzI(t), pzf (t)}t≥1;z=1,..,10 and {P za (t)}t≥1;z=1,..,10;a≥ra ,
for international prices {R?(t), p?(t)}t≥1, and an allocation of quantities {HzT (t)}t≥1;z=1,..,10,
{hza(t)}t≥1;a=T−9,..,T−3;z=1,..,10,
{Kz(t), δz(t), Y Iz(t), Y F z(t), Xz(t), Bz(t),M z(t)}t≥1;z=1,..,10
and {Sza(t), Cza(t), }t≥1;a=a0,..,20;z=1,..,10 such that the following equations are sat-
isfied for each period t ≥ 1 :
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(i) households maximization behaviour (3)–(8),
(ii) profit maximization of firms in the intermediate sector (10)–(13), and (14),
(iii) profit maximization in the final good sector gives (15)–(17),
(iv) world producer profit maximization (18) and (19),
(v) market clearing at each date :
Cz(t) + Iz(t) = Y F z(t) ∀z (20)
N z(t) =
r¯a∑
a=2
eza(t)L
z
a(t) ∀z (21)
Xz(t) +Bz(t) = Y Iz(t) ∀z (22)∑
z
M z(t) = Y ?(t) (23)
where Cz =
∑
a≥a0 τ
z
aL
z
ac
z
a is the aggregate consumption in region z. (20) is the
equilibrium condition on the final good domestic markets in all regions, (22) is the
intermediate goods market in all regions, (21) is the labour market equilibrium
in all regions and (23) is the equilibrium condition in the market for the world
intermediate good.
2.4.2 Walras’law and additional accounting identities
It can be easily shown that these equations (20)–(23) together to the previous
equilibrium equations are sufficient to describe the real equilibrium of the world
economy. As a matter of fact the equilibrium of the world capital market does
not appear in the previous definition because it is redundant here (i.e. the Walras’
Law). But because only relative prices are relevant to obtain equilibrium alloca-
tion one can also drop (or fix) one absolute price in the model. For calibration
purpose we will choose that at each time the price of the intermediate good in
the region "North America" will be set to one (pUSI (t) ≡ 1), so all values can be
expressed in US intermediate good units in our model.
It is then possible to recover standard aggregate budget constraint of national ac-
counts as well as the equilibrium of the world capital market from previous equi-
librium equations.
Regional accounts
One can check that the sum of budget constraints over all individuals (3) give an
expression of Cz that can be substituted in (20) in order to obtain (together with
the PAYG constraint (9)) :
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pzfY F
z = wzN z + pzf [K
z + (1− δ)Kz(−1)] + pzf [RzSz(−1)− Sz] (24)
Since Y Iz is linearly homogeneous, using the Euler rule and substituting prices
for quantities in the equation (24), with equations (12) and (13), gives :
pzfY F
z − pzIY Iz = pzf [Kz −RzKz(−1)]− pzf [Sz −RzSz(−1)] (25)
From (22) and given pzfY F z = p?M z − pzIBz (resulting from Y F z being linearly
homogenous) we also have :
pzfY F
z − pzIY Iz = p?M z − pzIXz (26)
one can then recover the following accounting identities (for all z) :
GDP z(t) = pzI(t)Y I
z(t) = pzf (t)Y F
z(t) + pzI(t)X
z(t)− p?(t)M z(t) (27)
where : pzI(t)Xz(t) − p?(t)M z(t) is the trade balance of region z expressed in
units of the domestic final good.
Equilibrium of the world financial market
We now show that, at the equilibrium, the world capital market is balanced.
Competitive behaviour of the World producer and Y ? being linearly homogenous
gives : Y ?(t) =
∑
z
pzI (t)
p?(t)
· Xz(t). This together with the world market equilib-
rium for the world intermediate good (23) implies that the sum of trade accounts
accross the world is equal to zero :∑
z
[pzI(t)X
z(t)− p?M z(t)] = 0 (28)
Then summing identities (25) over the regions implies (knowing from (26) that
this is equivalent to (28) : ∑z pzf [Kz − RzKz(−1)] = ∑z pzf [Sz − RzSz(−1)].
Then once the world market is cleared at time t− 1 this implies (with eq. (8)) that
it also clears at time t : ∑
z
pzfK
z =
∑
z
pzfS
z (29)
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2.4.3 Growth, technological diffusion and economic convergence
The level of Total Factor Productivity (TFP) is exogenous and grows at a constant
rate, in each region. For 1950 until 2000, the growth rate of TFP is given by his-
torical data. After this date the rate of growth of the TFP is the result of a given,
exogenous growth of 1.5% per annum in the "North America" region, supposed
to be the technological leader, and a region-specific, exogenous, catching-up fac-
tor, reflecting international diffusion of technological progress, according to the
following law of diffusions :
For Western Europe, Japan, India, South America, China :
AIz(t)
AIz(t− 1) = [1 + λ]×
AIN.Am(t)
AIN.Am(t− 1) ×
[
Ωzt + (1− Ωzt )
AIN.Am(t− 1)
AIz(t)
]
Eastern Europe, Russia, Mediterranean World, Africa :
AIz(t)
AIz(t− 1) = [1 + λ]×
AIW.Eu(t)
AIW.Eu(t− 1) ×
[
Ωzt + (1− Ωzt )
AIW.Eu(t− 1)
AIz(t)
]
where AIz is a measure of this level of knowledge ; λ is an acceleration factor
of technological growth common to all catching up regions (equal to 0.001 in the
baseline scenario), while Ωz is a brake on the convergence of technological levels.
One must notice that in our baseline scenario, we assume implicitly two conver-
gence clubs : one group of regions converges towards "North America", while
the other one converges towards "Western Europe". As a matter of fact, because
"Western Europe" converges towards "North America", in the steady state, every
region will have the same level for TFP. Notice also that the rhythms of conver-
gence will differ not only because the initial (i.e. in year 2000) levels and the
targets are different but also because we assume different values for Ωz (see Table
1). The corresponding relative levels of TFP are then reported in the Figure 4.
Table 1: Exogenous Catching-up : Baseline Scenario
region W.Eur. E.Eur Jap. Ind. S.Amer. Chin. Rus. Afr. Med.
Ωz 0.99975 0.999 0.99975 0.999 0.99975 0.999 0.99975 1.00 1.00
Figure 4 compares the profiles of TFP in the world regions of the INGENUE
2 model. Western Europe and Japan are assumed to resume their catching-up,
meaning that they absorb the IT revolution after North America. The takeoff
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Figure 4: Baseline Scenario - Total Factor Productivity (percentage of the "North
America"’s level) : 1950 - 2100
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in China and India, which has already started in the 1990’s, gains momentum.
Eastern Europe is also assumed to be a fast-growing region due to its participation
to the European Union. We take a dimmer view of the other regions. A relatively
slow catching up is assumed in South America and in the Mediterranean countries
where there are perennial difficulties in establishing efficient market institutions,
in promoting a large class of entrepreneurs and in generating non-corrupt and
competent governments. The same arises more seriously in Russia where the
catastrophic decline of the population is a further handicap. Finally we are more
pessimistic about Africa where we assume no catching-up in the level of TFP. Yet
the rise in TFP at the same rate of the leading region, even if it will entail no
catching-up, is a marked improvement compared to the last quarter of a century
which saw no progress at all and thus a relative setback on the rest of the world.
2.4.4 The calibration of the model
The departure point of our numerical analysis is the year 2000. So, in our cali-
bration strategy, the model must match the historical data at this date. To do this
simply, and in order to avoid any initial jump in the equilibrium variables, we
choose to start our simulation in year 1955, taking as given, first, the historical
values for state variable in 1950, and demographic and participation rates histor-
ical trajectories and projections. We then choose the parameters and exogenous
trajectories for sectoral factor productivity in order to get values for the endoge-
nous variables of the model near their observed values in 2000 (see Table 2). The
international macroeconomic data are taken from the Heston, Summers & Aten
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(2002) database.
Table 2: Exogenous Parameters of the model :
ρ α η δ Ψ σ µ
0.95 0.33 0.75 0.28 0.8 1.01 1.5
One must notice that in order to reproduce the selected stylized facts for each
region considered, the time preference parameters are neither set constant nor
similar between the different regions during the calibration period (i.e. between
1955 and 1995). Furthermore, the regional parameters of the CES production
functions are calibrated in order to reproduce the international trade shares for
each regions. In the calibration process, the relative productivity between sectors
are set in order to reproduce the exchange rates, and the human capital variables
are calibrated in order to reproduce the GDP per capita levels.
Despite numerous attempts, the model seems unable to reproduce the negative
current account of the North America region observed in 1995-2000. The deficit
in the early years of the century is due to the low saving rate of households in the
United States. It is assumed that this behaviour will not be sustainable in the long
run. So American households will converge to the saving behaviour observed in
other regions in the early decades. In terms of calibration strategy, we assume
that the psychological discount factor is initially lower (in 2000) in the "North
America" region than elsewhere, and that this parameter converges to the "world"
value during the first half of the XXI◦ century.
3 Baseline Case : a path for the world economy in
the first half of the XXIst Century
3.1 Interest rates
According to the model, the world real interest rate declines over the fifty years
period. This is due to global ageing. Figures 1 and 3 show that the working
age population is decelerating or declining while the age group of high savers
is growing in one region after another. As a result, the world saving-investment
balance is tilted more and more towards a lower interest rate. This downward
trend provides the general profile of regional real interest rates (see Figure 5).
The hierarchy of regional real interest rates is linked to the rate of change of the
real exchange rates. The real interest rates regulate investment and saving flows as
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Figure 5: Regional interest rates :
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explained below. The gap between investment and saving is the current account
balance of each region. It is financed by capital flows whose amounts are such
that yield differentials between different regions cancel out in every period.
3.2 Regional economic growth
Assumptions regarding technological convergence are conservative in the baseline
scenario. Besides, the parameters that define public pension systems perpetuate
existing policies in the beginning of the XXI◦ century. Therefore the pattern of
the GDP regional growth rates largely follows that of the regional labour force
growth rates.
Two characteristics stand out (see Figure 6). Firstly, there is a general slowdown in
growth because the working age population growth rate diminishes in all regions
but Africa after 2000. Secondly the dispersion in the growth rates is almost as
large in 2050 as in 2000, because ageing is a lengthy process with countervailing
impacts on the labour force of less-developed countries. Nevertheless conver-
gence in total factor productivity has an impact since the dispersion in the growth
rates of the labour force is substantially higher in 2050 than in 2000, while the
dispersion in the GDP growth rates is slightly lower. The Chinese region, which
encompasses already developed countries, is the one where the catching up is the
fastest. It is why its growth rate matches other regions with much higher growth
in their labour force.
North America and Europe have growth profiles that partly differ from the gen-
eral pattern. In North America, GDP growth decelerates precipitously in the first
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Figure 6: GDP growth rate (2000-2050)
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decade after 2000, because both the labour force and productivity do so. But the
working age population stops declining in 2025, recovers and remains stationary
thereafter. It ensues that GDP growth converges to nearly 2% per annum, one of
the highest growth rates in 2050. Europe (both West and East) and worse Russia
have a somber future. Western Europe follows a similar profile as North Amer-
ica but at much lower growth rates. GDP growth decelerates fast after 2000 until
2030 from 3.2% to 0.7% and keeps this poor performance until 2050. The Russian
world is the region with the lowest growth rate almost throughout the half century
and ends up in complete stagnation.
3.3 Investment and Saving
Because the model works at full employment with an exogenous labour force,
the stock of capital in each period is a rising function of employment adjusted
for labour efficiency and of capital intensity (capital/effective labour). The ratio
of capital intensity is itself increasing with TFP and decreasing with the gross
return to capital. The latter is the sum of the regional real interest rate and the
depreciation ratio. Prices enter the picture and they bring the whole system of
intertwined relationships. The regional net rate of interest is the sum of the world
interest rate which clears the world financial market and of the rate of change of
the region’s real exchange rate against the US. Those relationships proceed from
the risk-neutral arbitrage in financial markets.
Gross investment rises with net capital accumulation and with replacement, which
is modulated by the change in the rate of depreciation in debtor regions. Therefore
in regions with a fast growth of the labour force and high foreign indebtedness,
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Figure 7: Net saving (as a % of GNP)
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raising markedly the rate of economic depreciation, the rate of gross investment to
GDP will increase until 2030. Such conditions explain African pattern, the initial
capital stock being very low in this region. India follows a similar pattern albeit
less strongly. With a constant depreciation ratio, and an interest rate declining
compared to the world rate, North America keeps a rate of gross investment to
GDP remarkably steady (see figure 8).
Figure 8: Gross Investment (as a % of GDP):
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This is not the case of Japan and Western Europe. Despite the lowest real inter-
est rates due to the continuous appreciation of their real exchange rates, leading
to a low cost of capital, these regions have such a declining labour force that it
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impinges negatively upon capital accumulation. Yet the rise in capital intensity
counteracts the effect of the labour force. It is why the rate of investment declines
less than it does in faster growing regions like China and South America. Finally
Russia has a peculiar profile, because there is an exogenous shock on investment
in the early 2000’s to recover from the collapse of the 1990’s which led to the
scrapping of more than half of the capital stock; hence the humped-shape curve
of Russian rate of investment, which remains by far the lowest of all regions.
3.4 Exchange rates and world finance
The world financial equilibrium allocates capital flows so as to fill finance current
account imbalances. Nevertheless the equilibrium in financial markets is a stock
equilibrium. Exchange rates are affected by net foreign assets. They move with
the net financial positions of the regions to create future surpluses or deficits, so
that current accounts are balanced in the very long run, i.e. there is no more accu-
mulation of net foreign assets or debts. In INGENUE the magnitude of financial
positions is measured by the ownership ratio. This is the ratio of the aggregate
wealth accumulated by households in the region to the capital stock laid out in the
region. Hence a ratio above one is tantamount to a creditor position against the
rest of the world, a ratio less than one to a debtor position (see Figure 9). Despite
the general interdependence of prices one can roughly say that the world interest
rate is the price which equilibrates the world financial market as a whole, match-
ing total aggregate wealth and world capital stock. Real exchange rates appreciate
relatively to North America in the two regions that have consistently an ownership
ratio higher than North America : Western Europe and Japan (see Figure 10.
Figure 9: Ownership ratio :
0,70
0,75
0,80
0,85
0,90
0,95
1,00
1,05
1,10
1,15
1,20
2000 2005 2010 2015 2020 2025 2030 2035 2040 2045 2050
N. America W. Europe Japan S. America Mediterranean
Africa Russia China India E. Europe
24
Nevertheless, except in these two regions and in Russia, the latter due to terms
of trade effects, exchange rate changes are not much sensitive to the stocks of
financial assets. The paths of the exchange rates are mostly parallel to the one of
North America.
The ownership ratios are determined by cumulative current account balances. The
most striking feature is the divergent profile of North America (see figure 9). As
it has been explained above, it is due to an assumed change in household saving
behaviour. With this structural change and with a population consistently younger
than in Japan and Europe, the rise in saving in North America is conveyed into a
double improvement in the current account balance and the ownership ratio.
Figure 10: Real Exchange Rate :
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The main conclusion for the other regions is a shrinking of the discrepancies in
current accounts along the half century. Japan and Western Europe remain con-
tinuously in surplus but less and less with the rise in their dependency ratio. The
Mediterranean region is in surplus for most of the time but goes into a slight deficit
in the last two decades. Africa, the Indian world and Eastern Europe, with large
current account deficits at the start of the century, are reducing it as long as their
growth rate is diminishing and their households save more because they get older
and richer. Ownership ratios do not show the same converging pattern, because re-
gions accumulate either net foreign assets or debts because the sign of the current
account balance does not change along the fifty year period.
Figure 11 depicts current account balances as a percentage of regional GDP. It
shows that the polarization between creditor and debtor regions will persist with
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Figure 11: Current Account (as a % of GDP)
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the notable exception of North America. Therefore the profiles of the ownership
ratio do not exhibit any convergence (see figure 9). The building of a strong cred-
itor position in North America stands out. The slight improvement in the debtor
position of Africa and Eastern Europe stems from the steady reduction of the
deficit in those two regions. In India, where the improvement is less pronounced,
the ownership ratio is continuously deteriorating. India will become the largest
debtor according to this measure in the last decade before 2050.
3.5 Foreign trade
In the INGENUE model, tradable goods are intermediary and the competitiveness
of each region depends on the terms of trade against the world producer whose
price is itself an average of intermediate goods prices in the different regions.
Three regions have ever-rising terms of trade, i.e. loss of competitiveness: Japan,
Western Europe, Russia. The other regions have constant or slightly declining
terms of trade. The weak growth in the three former regions, much weaker than
in others (see figure 6), pushes prices upwards. In Japan and Western Europe
those rising prices generate the widening trade deficit to match the demand of
intermediate goods by the final goods sector (see figure 12).
In the Russian world, the population declines more than anywhere else and the
consumption per capita is lower. Furthermore, Russian intermediate products are
primary commodities in strong world demand. It ensues that the valuing effect
of the terms of trade takes over. After deteriorating alongside Japan and Western
Europe, the Russian trade balance turns around to an increasing surplus there-
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Figure 12: Trade balance (as a % of regional GDP) :
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after. Most other regions with little change in competitiveness improve their trade
balance, moving from deficit to surplus.
4 Pension reforms in Western Europe
In the baseline scenario (BS), the European pension system is characterized by
two major features, which we have supposed untouched all along the 21st cen-
tury : a low legal retirement age (62.5 years on average) and a fairly high replace-
ment rate (48%). We now propose to investigate the consequences, in our model,
of two kinds of pension reforms in Europe and of a migratory scenario, keeping
the institutions in other regions of the world identical to baseline :
• Scenario 1 : Constant contribution rate (CCR): Maintaining the European
pension contribution rate to the level it reached at the end of the XX◦ century
(18%) (see left-hand side of figure 14). The result is a progressive and
significant decline of the replacement rate as European population ages: by
2050, it would be reduced by 55%. But in the baseline scenario, keeping
the replacement rate constant induces a marked increase in the contribution
rate that reaches 32% by mid-century, and stabilizes around 25% in the very
long run, in the aftermath of the baby-boom shock.
• Scanario 2 : Postponing the legal retirement age progressively over the pe-
riod 2000-2025 (PRA). We choose a reform that implies a five-year switch
of the participation rate for people aged between 45 years old and 65 years
old. This reform is put in place progressively between years 2000 and 2020.
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Then, for example, the participation rate of the age-group 60 to 64 yrs in
2020 will be set equal to the participation rate of the 55 to 59 yrs old in the
year 2000. In the baseline case, about 22% of West-European aged 60-64
are working in 2020. With the PRA reform put in place, 55% of West-
European aged 60-64 are working (see left-hand side of figure 13). In this
scenario, the replacement rate is held constant at its 2000 level, and, as a re-
sult, the contribution rate increases much less than in the baseline scenario :
it reaches 27% in 2050.
• Scenario 3 : Migratory scenario (MIG) : We also investigate the macroe-
conomic consequences of a specific migratory scenario. Such a scenario
cannot be considered strictly as a pension reform. Nevertheless, the com-
parison with pension reforms scenarios seems accurate as increased labour
mobility could transitorily alleviate the financial burden on the public retire-
ment system (by limiting the increase of the dependency ratio and therefore
the rise of the contribution rate)7. Several papers have studied this specific
question8. The value-added of the INGENUE model is that it is fit to de-
scribe the consequences of migrations on both the regions receiving and
losing migrants.
In our migratory scenario, the flows of migrants into Western Europe are cali-
brated in order to get a dependency ratio between 2000 and 2080 close to the
one that we get in the PRA pension reform mentioned just above (see left-hand
side of figure 14). In this scenario, migratory flows are substantial between 2005
and 2025 such that the dependency ratio is similar to the one that we get in the
PRA case (see right-hand side of figure 13). During this period, the numbers of
migrants is 11.8 millions of persons on average for each five-year periods consid-
ered9. From 2025 and until 2055, no migrant moves into Western Europe but the
dependency ratio is then below the one of the PRA case as the children of the first
cohorts of migrants are entering the labour force. In 2050-2060, the dependency
ratio peaks at the same level in the two scenarios (about 0.8 compared with 1.0
in the baseline scenario). At each period, the migrants are assumed to be young
adults (aged between 20 and 24 years) who adjust to the productivity of the host
regions as soon as they enter the labour force. Furthermore, we assume that they
move into Western Europe without any capital.
7While migrations has generally not been an important source of population growth in most
advanced countries in recent years, in the past there have been periods when substantial flows of
labour have occured, most notably during the 1820-1913 when large numbers of migrants moved
from Europe to the United States and other countries of the new world.
8See for example Fehr, Jokisch & Kotlikoff (2004).
911% of total migrants are coming from Eastern Europe, 29% from the Mediterranean, 25%
from Africa and 35% from the rest of the world.
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Figure 13: Pension Reforms in Europe:
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4.1 Macroeconomic consequences
Because these reforms are assumed to be perfectly anticipated as soon as they are
announced (beginning of the XXI◦ century), their major direct and most immedi-
ate effects are, of course, on individual saving behaviour, and hence, on aggregate
saving.
Unsurprisingly, compared to the baseline scenario, the CCR reform raises the sav-
ing rate of Western Europe all along the half century (see Figure 15) : as the public
pension system is made less generous, European households save and accumulate
more in order to compensate the effect of lower pensions on consumption in re-
tirement.
Because labour supply is exogenous, this saving effect is the only direct effect
on households, and it corresponds to a change in the time profile of their budget
constraint. As a consequence, consumption per capita is below its level in the
baseline scenario during the first periods, until 2035 (see figure 17). Such an ad-
verse demand shock tends to lower the price of the final goods and therefore, leads
to a depreciation of the real exchange rate. The latter induces an improvement of
the trade balance surplus in comparison with the baseline scenario as European
exports (as a share of GDP) are sustained until 2030. After that date, consumption
per capita is above its baseline level and the real exchange rate is higher than in
the baseline scenario (see figure 17). Households have accumulated saving and
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Figure 14: Pension Reforms in Europe :
Dependency ratio : Contribution rate :
0,2
0,3
0,4
0,5
0,6
0,7
0,8
0,9
1,0
1980 1990 2000 2010 2020 2030 2040 2050 2060 2070 2080
Baseline scenario PRA Migratory scenario
5
10
15
20
25
30
35
1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010 2015 2020 2025 2030 2035 2040 2045 2050
Baseline scenario PRA scenario Migratory scenario CCR scenario
the ownership ratio is above its baseline level (see figure 19) : hence, due to the
households saving decisions, Western Europe becomes a permanent exporter of
capital to the rest of the world, with a large initial current account surplus.
By contrast, the implementation of the postponement of retirement-age (PRA re-
form) slightly reduces aggregate saving in Western Europe all along the half cen-
tury (see figure 15). This reform induces an increase of the permanent income
of the West-European households. This positive effect on their life cycle income
leads to an increase of consumption per capita (and of GDP per capita). As a
consequence, European saving falls substantially as soon as the reform is put in
place.
The saving stays well below its baseline level until 2025 (about 1.25 point) ; after
this date, net saving increases but still remain below the baseline level by about
0.5 point. Initially, the announcement and progressive implementation of the post-
ponement of retirement-age reduces aggregate saving in Europe, as those initially
concerned are the high-savers, who immediately expect a higher life-cycle income
and the necessity to finance consumption over a shorter retirement period. Be-
sides, the postponing of the legal retirement age leads to a substantial increase
of the annual growth of the working age population between 2005 and 2025.
This increase induces a rise of investment during that period. With lower saving
and higher investment, the West-European interest rate is therefore substantially
higher than is the baseline case until 2025. The initial rise of the regional interest
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Figure 15: Pension Reforms in Europe : Saving rate
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rate comes from the decrease of capital supply (i.e. the fall of the net saving) and
the increase of the capital demand for investment. After 2025, investment growth
decelerates and comes back to its baseline level10. The European real exchange
rate stays below its baseline level throughout the study period11 (see figure 16).
Such a depreciation of the exchange rate could be explained noticeably by the
decrease of the price of the European final good. The latter is induced by the
positive supply shock (coming from the working age population rise) that exceeds
the demand shock coming from the positive effect on the life-cycle income of the
West-European households. The trade balance is below its baseline level during
the first periods (until 2020) in relation with the increase in imports growth due to
the sustained domestic demand (see figure 18).
Afterwards, imports growth rate is below its baseline level whereas the West-
European exports growth is above its baseline level, explaining the improvement
observed in the trade balance surplus. The current account stays below its baseline
level throughout the study period as the ownership ratio is decreasing from the
baseline case (the saving rate stays below its baseline level and the investment
growth is sustained).
The impact of the migratory scenario on the GDP growth rate is more important
than in the PRA scenario (see right-hand side of figure 20). Nevertheless, after
2025, GDP growth rate remains sustained, though decelerating : even if there is
no migratory flow into Western Europe between 2030 and 2050, the working age
10The European GDP growth rate (in difference from the baseline scenario) follows a similar
pattern (see right-hand side of figure 20).
11A similar pattern could be observed for the terms of trade.
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Figure 16: Pension Reforms in Europe : Real exchange rate : difference from
baseline scenario
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population in this region is still growing thanks to the children of the first cohorts
of migrants12. Furthermore, the investment to GDP ratio is well above its baseline
level throughout the study period, whereas it is close to the baseline level in the
PRA case. Initially, the level of consumption per capita is lower than in the base-
line scenario. The reason lies in the production sector : the inflow of workers re-
duces capital intensity relative to baseline. The marginal productivity of capital is
raised and the interest rate as well. Conversely, labour productivity is diminished
with a lower capital intensity. The real wage rate, being a decreasing function of
the return on capital on the factor price frontier, is itself on a slower path than
in baseline. It ensues that relatively to the baseline scenario consumption is less
magnified than total population ; hence consumption per capita is lower. Around
2030, when saving gains momentum (see figure 15) the interest rate recedes a bit
because saving grows faster than investment13. Therefore the growth of consump-
tion per capita relative to baseline turns positive from 2020 onwards and the level
moves overtake the baseline one in 2035. The sharp increase of saving (compared
to the baseline trajectory) from 2030 is mainly explained by the facts that the first
cohorts of migrants are now entering the "high saver" cohorts (aged between 45
and 69).
Because of the rise in interest rate, the saving investment balance stays more in
surplus than in the baseline scenario. The current account balance, which was al-
12One must note that in the PRA case, there is no effect on the working age population growth
after 2040.
13Furthermore, the flow of new migrants will disappear between 2030 and 2055.
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Figure 17: Pension Reforms in Europe : Consumption per capita : difference from
baseline scenario
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ready in surplus in baseline, is therefore more so. It follows from the improvement
of the current account balance that Western Europe reinforces its creditor position
in the world economy. The ownership ratio rises systematically above baseline
(see figure 19).
The effects of the various European pension reforms on the world interest rate are
shown in the left-hand side of figure 20. As expected, the CCR reform is associ-
ated with a permanently lower interest rate, as European saving rate is constantly
above its baseline level. The same adjustment apply for the migratory scenario.
On the contrary, the PRA reform induces a permanently higher interest rate.
These European pension reforms thus have induced consequences on the rest of
the world, via the changes in the world capital market equilibrium, hence on the
world interest rate. As expected, the CCR reform that increases European aggre-
gate savings over the whole century also improve the ownership ratio of Western
Europe (see figure 19). In the PRA reform, the European ownership ratio is per-
manently lower than in the baseline case, as European investment is permanently
increased. Conversely, the migratory scenario leads to an improvement of the for-
eign position of Western Europe as saving increases much more than investment.
Compared to the baseline current account evolution, the PRA reforms scenarios
yields to a substantially smaller European surplus over the study period. In the
CCR reform scenario, on the contrary, Europe is a permanent exporter of capital
to the rest of the world, with a large initial current account surpluses. In the rest
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Figure 18: Pension Reforms in Europe : Trade Balance (as a % of GDP) : differ-
ence from baseline scenario
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of the world, the constellation of regional current accounts is only mildly affected
by European pension reforms, their consequences being only indirect, mainly via
the world interest rate.
4.2 Distributional consequences of pension reforms
More capitalization (as a consequence of the CCR reform) leads to an increase
in the financial position of European households. In the rest of the world, the ef-
fects of the two reforms are the opposite to those in Western Europe. Indeed, with
integrated capital markets, the extra-savings in Europe for retirement motives,
implies necessarily international capital export flows under CCR which implies
increase in the GDP and in the wages in the other countries, and then an increase
in their consumption during the first periods. As time passes, Europeans reduce
their extra saving (because they have funded enough their retirement income), the
interest rate increases, and retired people begin to have more important asset in-
come from their domestic investment but also from financial investment abroad.
Because a more important share of the other countries GDP is now going to Eu-
ropean households (through capital income flows) consumption in these countries
is reduced with respect to the baseline in the long run.
In the PRA case, the main effect of the reform is to increase directly European
GDP with the labour demand. The resulting increase in the European wage bill
leads to an important rise in the consumption. But this also implies new opportuni-
ties of investment in Europe for the rest of the world in the short run (as European
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Figure 19: Pension Reforms in Europe : Ownership ratio
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marginal productivity of capital rises with European labour) so in those regions,
consumption will decrease at this time. In the long run, this policy implies an
obvious increase of resources at the world level : Europeans still have a greater
consumption level than in any other scenario (GDP per capita is higher). But this
reform is also profitable to the rest of the world which has previously accumulated
more West-European assets than in the CCR case.
Concerning the migratory scenario, the mirror effect of the improving economic
situation in Western Europe due to immigration is a deterioration in the regions of
emigration, and noticeably in Eastern Europe. The magnitude of the deterioration
depends on the loss of potential workers relative to the total of the labour force
in the region. One must notice that, in our scenario, Eastern Europe undergo the
most adverse consequences of emigration as it is a region much advanced in the
ageing process, and is already suffering from a declining population.
Over the next fifty years, the CCR reform seems to be the more accurate policy
in order to redistribute resources to people with less than 60 years-old (see figure
21).
When the CCR reform is put in place, consumption per capita is lower than in the
baseline scenario for the generations of households aged between 30 and 80. In
2050, the intergenerational redistribution induced by this pension reform leads to
a consumption per capita sharply higher for the younger households than in the
baseline scenario whereas it is lower for the older (households aged 60 and more,
born before 1990). This kind of intergenerational redistribution may be justified
by the fact that, in our benchmark economy, European households with more than
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Figure 20: Annual rate - Pension Reforms (difference to baseline trajectories)
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60 years-old have, at the end of the last century, a standard of living which is
the double of the one of the people with less than 40 years-old. Concerning the
PRA case, consumption per capita is higher than in the baseline case in 2005 only
for the households whose age are inferior to 65 years. In 2050, consumption per
capita is higher than in the baseline scenario for all the generations. The migratory
scenario leads initially to an increase of consumption per capita for the households
who are 50 years-old and more. In 2050, consumption per capita is higher for
almost all the generations but it is not evenly distributed : the rise does not exceed
5% for young people (aged below 55, born after 1995) and is superior to 10% for
the older generations (aged above 75, born before 1975).
5 Concluding Remarks
When analysing the prospects of public, pay-as-you-go pension systems in OECD
countries, the emphasis, in most studies over the past two decades, has been on the
macroeconomic and inter-generational, distributional consequences of aging pop-
ulations in the framework of models that have tended not to take into account, or
conversely to over-stress the implications of economic and financial globalization
on domestic evolutions. The model used here to accommodate such analytical
needs and this paper has tried to present its major features, its functioning, as
well as a number of distinctive results that differ markedly from what would ob-
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Figure 21: Europe : Average consumption by age-groups (% changes to BS)
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tain in either autarkic, closed-economy models, or small, open-economy models.
The interplay between aging populations displaying different time profiles in the
various regions of the world and pay-as-you-go pension systems with different
characteristics yields significant fluctuations and discrepancies in world and re-
gional economic variables, as well as fairly large international capital flows in our
baseline scenario and in the various pension reforms studied.
Such large capital flows on average help smoothing the long accumulation cycles
that arise from aging and fluctuations in population sizes. Although they may
seem excessive, our paper shows that they are significantly smaller in an integrated
world model than in models that treat developed countries in isolation as small,
open economies.
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Appendix A:
The 10 regions of the model :
The World is divided in the ten following regions according mainly to geographi-
cal and demographic criteria.
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1. "Western Europe" : ’Channel Islands’, ’Denmark’, ’Finland’, ’Iceland’,
’Ireland’, ’Norway’, ’Sweden’, ’United Kingdom’, ’Greece’, ’Italy’, ’Malta’,
’Portugal’, ’Spain’, ’Austria’, ’Belgium’, ’France’, ’Germany’ (East + West),
’Luxembourg’, ’Netherlands’, ’Switzerland’.
2. "Eastern Europe" : ’Estonia’, ’Latvia’, Lithuania’, ’Bulgaria’, ’Czech Re-
public’, ’Hungary’, ’Poland’ ’Romania’, ’Slovakia’, ’Slovenia’, ’Albania’,
’Bosnia and Herzegovina’, ’Croatia’, ’TFYR Macedonia’, ’Yugoslavia’.
3. "North America" : ’Canada’, ’United States of America’, ’Australia’,
’New Zealand’, ’Melanesia’, ’Fiji’, ’New Caledonia’, ’Papua New Guinea’,
Solomon Islands’, ’Vanuatu’, ’Micronesia’, ’Guam’, ’Polynesia’, ’French
Polynesia’, ’Samoa’.
4. "Latin America" : ’Argentina’, ’Bolivia’, ’Brazil’, ’Chile’, ’Colombia’,
’Ecuador’, ’French Guiana’, ’Guyana’, ’Paraguay’, ’Peru’, ’Suriname’, ’Uruguay’,
’Venezuela’, ’Belize’, ’Costa Rica’, ’El Salvador’, ’Guatemala’, ’Honduras’,
’Mexico’, ’Nicaragua’, ’Panama’, ’Bahamas’, ’Barbados’, ’Cuba’, ’Do-
minican Republic’, ’Guadeloupe’, ’Haiti’, ’Jamaica’, ’Martinique’, ’Nether-
lands Antilles’, ’Puerto Rico’, ’Saint Lucia’, ’Trinidad and Tobago’.
5. Japan
6. "Mediterranean World" : ’Algeria’, ’Egypt’, ’Libyan Arab Jamahiriya’,
’Morocco’, , ’Tunisia’, ’Western Sahara’, ’Armenia’, ’Azerbaijan’, ’Bahrain’,
’Cyprus’, ’Georgia’, ’Iraq’, ’Iran’, ’Israel’, ’Jordan’, ’Kuwait’, ’Lebanon’,
’Occupied Palestinian Territory’, ’Oman’, ’Qatar’, ’Saudi Arabia’, ’Syr-
ian Arab Republic’, ’Turkey’, ’United Arab Emirates’, ’Yemen’. ’Turk-
menistan’, ’Uzbekistan’ ’Kyrgyzstan’
7. "Chinese World" : ’China’, ’Democratic People’s Republic of Korea’,
’Mongolia’, ’Republic of Korea’, ’Brunei Darussalam’, ’Cambodia’, ’East
Timor’, ’Lao People’s Democratic Republic’, ’Myanmar’, ’Philippines’,
’Singapore’, ’Thailand’, ’Viet Nam’.
8. "Africa" : ’Burundi’, ’Comoros’, ’Djibouti’, ’Eritrea’, ’Ethiopia’, ’Kenya’,
’Madagascar’, ’Malawi’, ’Mauritius’, ’Mozambique’, ’Réunion’, ’Rwanda’,
’Somalia’, ’Uganda’, ’Tanzania’, ’Zambia’, ’Zimbabwe’, ’Angola’, ’Cameroon’,
’Central African Republic’, ’Chad’, ’Congo’, ’Democratic Republic of the
Congo’, ’Equatorial Guinea’, ’Gabon’, ’Botswana’, ’Lesotho’, ’Namibia’,
’South Africa’, ’Swaziland’, ’Benin’, ’Burkina Faso’, ’Cape Verde’, ’Côte
d’Ivoire’, ’Gambia’, ’Ghana’, ’Guinea’, ’Guinea-Bissau’, ’Liberia’, ’Mali’,
’Mauritania’, ’Niger’, ’Nigeria’, ’Senegal’, ’Sierra Leone’, ’Togo’. ’Sudan’
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9. "Russian World" : ’Belarus’, ’Russian Federation’, ’Ukraine’. ’Kaza-
khstan’, ’Republic of Moldova’,
10. "Indian World" : ’India’, ’Afghanistan’, ’Bangladesh’, ’Bhutan’, ’Mal-
dives’, ’Nepal’, ’Pakistan’, ’Sri Lanka’, ’Tajikistan’, ’Indonesia’, ’Malaysia’.
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